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Command, Competition, and Cooperation
Coordination in the firm is by command, although
persuasion and various sorts of exchanges may also be
important. A manager determines the exact task a person
performs. The manager's challenge is to decide how best to
use the available resources. Coordination in the market is
based on voluntary transactions. The ability of command to
coordinate is obvious, whereas the ability of the market to
coordinate is not so obvious. This difference is apparent
whenever the economy experiences a problem; there is always
a demand that the government "do something." In the 1930s
it responded with massive public works. In the early 1970s,
when the public realized that inflation was a problem, the
clamor for action led to wage and price controls. The rapid
rise in oil prices in the late 1970s led to a mass of
regulations. In each of these cases and in a huge number of
others that could be cited, restrictions are placed on the
market. Instead of relying solely on coordination through
the market, the government decides to rely at least partly
on command. What is remarkable, however, is that in few of
the cases of government intervention is there convincing
evidence that the government action had its intended effect.
In many of them, there is evidence, though often
not conclusive, that government action had harmful side
effects. The difficulty of achieving results through
government action may be largely due to the costs of using
command--the visible hand--as a means of coordination.
If there were no costs to using command, one would expect
the vision (or nightmare) of Karl Marx to be reality
today--monopoly capital. In Marx's vision, one capitalist
would gobble up another until in the end only a few giant
capitalists would own and run everything. Then, the
revolution would come. But this vision of the giant
capitalists ignores the costs of giving incentives to
workers, monitoring their behavior, and deciding how best to
use their skills. It is ironic that the closest
approximations to the monopoly capitalists that Marx
predicted were the centrally-planned states of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. In their attempt to eliminate
the market, they organized their economies as a giant
state-run enterprise. The poor performances in satisfying
consumer wants that these economies experienced were largely
due to their use of command in places where the market was a
much cheaper way to organize.
Industries that have the ability to easily monitor
quality and speed will find coordination by command cheap.
Such industries will generally have increasing returns to
scale and thus large firms. Industries in which it is not
easy to monitor quality and speed will tend to have many
small firms. Agriculture is an example of this second sort
of industry. Attempts to farm on a large scale have not been
notably successful in the United States. In the former
Soviet Union and in other socialist countries, the
structuring of agriculture in large organized farms was
disastrous in terms of food production. Agriculture cannot
be made into an assembly-line process, and the many factors
that determine the success of the crop make it difficult to
determine responsibility if someone does shirk. As a result,
very large land owners in the United States more often rent
their land to independent farmers than hire farmers to
cultivate it.
In the abstract theory of exchange economics, the
internal world of the firm does not exist. All coordination
is through the price mechanism. However, the existence of
large organizations, established on a voluntary basis,
points out that coordination through the invisible hand
requires resources, and that those who find ways to
coordinate more cheaply can profit from their discoveries.
In a way, the existence of large firms is an irony in a
market economy. They indicate that a way to succeed in a
market economy is to find a better way to coordinate people
than market coordination, to replace the market by
command.
Perhaps a reason that team sports are so popular in a
country that so honors the individual is that they reflect a
paradox of the modern world: those groups that cooperate
best internally are best able to compete externally. Team
sports encourage both cooperation and competition; the two
are not incompatible. The often-heard criticism of
capitalism, that it encourages competition and thus
discourages cooperation, ignores the very existence of the
large coordinated enterprises that are most visible in the
economy.
Next we discuss screening
and signaling.
Copyright
Robert Schenk
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