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Interpretations
Disagreement about how to measure monetary policy leads
to very different interpretations of the past. For example,
the United States experienced rapid growth in 1964 and 1965.
A monetary explanation notes that the growth of money kept
increasing during the first half of the 1960s. From 1961 to
1962, money stock rose by 2.1%, and in the next three years
it rose by 2.9%, 3.9%, and 4.2%. The monetary explanation
interprets this monetary growth as an easing of policy, so
no other factors are necessary to explain the rapid growth
in spending.
An alternative explanation notes that interest rates
changed little during these years, rising very slightly from
1963 to 1965. Thus, this view does not see the source of
economic growth in monetary policy. Rather it looks to the
large fiscal expansion, primarily in the form of a major tax
cut in February of 1964. In this view, the tax cut was the
force that propelled the expansion and monetary policy
merely accommodated it, that is, did not stand in its way.
Arthur Okun summarized this view as follows:
"[T]he monetary policy that was actually
pursued would not in itself have quickened the pace of
the economy. It supplied a good set of tires for the
economy to move on, but fiscal policy was the engine of
growth."1
The dispute about why output dropped in the U.S. from
1929 to 1931 is another example of the importance of the
indicator. For a person using money as an indicator of
monetary policy, the explanation of the drop is
straightforward. The amount of money fell throughout the
period from late 1929 until early 1933, and thus "tight"
money explains the drop in output for the entire period.
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz draw this conclusion in
their A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1960 (Princeton University Press, 1963). In their
interpretation an ordinary recession was turned into a
severe depression by the large number of bank failures. As
people lost faith in the banking system, they converted
deposits into currency. The loss of currency reduced bank
reserves, and since a dollar of bank reserves could support
several dollars of checking-account money, this conversion
of deposits into currency reduced money. If the banks had
not been allowed to fail, or if the Federal Reserve had
offset the withdrawal of currency, the Depression, according
to this view, would have been an ordinary, minor
recession.
For a person who watches interest rates, the story looks
very different. How can one be sure that the fall in
spending did not cause the fall in money, rather than vice
versa? Peter Temin argues that if a change in money is
autonomous, that is, not caused by a change in income, "then
we should be able to observe a temporary [change] in
the rate of interest on assets bearing some resemblance to
money."2 To use an analogy, one expects that if
there is a shortage of apples, one should be able to see
effects in the prices of closely related goods, such as in
the price of oranges or pears.
Interest rates rose late in 1929 and again late in 1931,
so Temin concedes that monetary forces probably played some
role in the start of the Depression and in its later stages.
But from 1929 until late 1931, short-term interest rates
fell, from about 6% to about 2%. In particular, Temin sees
no rise in November and December of 1930, months of the
first runs on banks and an episode that Friedman and
Schwartz say changed the character of the decline. Long-term
rates do increase, from about 5 1/2% to about 6 1/2%, but
this is not enough evidence to stop Temin from concluding
that money was passive from October of 1929 until September
of 1931. Temin attributes much of the decline in spending
during this period to an autonomous and unexplained drop in
consumption.
Economics can be frustrating when two contradictory
explanations can interpret the data equally well. Temin
explains away the drop in money as the effect rather than
the cause of the drop in income. Friedman and Schwartz
explain away the failure of short-term interest rates to
rise by arguing that in a time of a banking crisis, there is
a demand for liquidity by both banks and the public. Thus
"banks and others were inclined to dispose of their
lower-grade bonds; the very desire for liquidity made
government bonds ever more desirable as secondary reserves;
hence the yield on lower grade securities rose...while
yields on government bonds fell."3 Temin argues
that an autonomous decrease in money should cause short-term
interest rates to rise as people sell short-term assets
trying to regain their lost money balances, while Friedman
and Schwartz argue that when a banking panic reduces money,
the desire for safe, liquid assets causes people to buy
short-term assets.
The dispute among economists about how monetary policy
should be measured reflects a division on how they view the
economy. The economy is too complex for any human brain to
fully understand. As a result, people try to make sense of
it in terms of simplified mental pictures. In some of these
pictures, changes in money are more directly and closely
related to the determination of spending than in others.
Both sides of the dispute appeal to feedback (or reverse
causation) in arguing their position. Those who believe that
interest rates are the best way to measure monetary policy
argue that some movements in money stock are caused by
changes in economic activity, and thus it is misleading to
try to explain movements in total spending in terms of
movements in money. Those who believe that a monetary
aggregate is the best way to measure monetary policy argue
that many forces affect interest rates besides monetary
policy. Expectations about the future course of economic
growth and about future rates of inflation, both of which
depend in part on past and present economic conditions, can
cause large changes in interest rates.
Next we take a peek at the topic of policy
rules.
 
1 The
Political Economy of
Prosperity,
(New York: Norton, 1970) p. 59.
2 Did Monetary Forces Cause
the Great Depression? (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1976) p. 102.
3 A
Monetary
History,
p. 312.
Copyright
Robert Schenk
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